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Abstract – The increasing autonomy of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
(MANETs) has enabled a great many large-scale unguided 
missions, such as agricultural planning, conservation and similar 
surveying tasks. Commercial and military institutions have 
expressed great interest in such ventures; raising the question of 
security as the application of such systems in potentially hostile 
environments becomes a desired function of such networks. 
Preventing theft, disruption or destruction of such MANETs 
through cyber-attacks has become a focus for many researchers as 
a result. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) have been shown to 
enhance the security of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), at a 
high cost in network resources during the setup of secure tunnels. 
VPNs do not normally support broadcast communication, 
reducing their effectiveness in high-traffic MANETs, which have 
many broadcast communication requirements. To support 
routing, broadcast updates and efficient MANET communication, 
a Virtual Closed Network (VCN) architecture is proposed. By 
supporting private, secure communication in unicast, multicast 
and broadcast modes, VCNs provide an efficient alternative to 
VPNs when securing MANETs. Comparative analysis of the set-
up overheads of VCN and VPN approaches is provided between 
OpenVPN, IPsec, Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS), and the 
proposed VCN solution: Security Using Pre-Existing Routing for 
MANETs (SUPERMAN).  
Keywords – virtual closed network; virtual private network; 
security; MANET; autonomy 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Interest in swarms of autonomous UAVs is growing rapidly, 
with civilian and military authorities spearheading initiatives 
that will see the deployment of many aerial mobile nodes 
capable of self-control and self-guidance on a wide range of 
missions [1]. A key issue of such projects is the security of the 
communication required for inter-swarm communication. 
Autonomous systems require a large amount of communication 
to operate, before even considering any swarm-to-base 
communication requirements [2]. As a result, secure Mobile Ad 
hoc Network (MANET) communication has become a key topic 
for discussion, where autonomous activity is seen as desirable. 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) provide a means for nodes 
to communicate securely and privately over an otherwise 
insecure medium. Traditionally, such networks have operated 
over the Internet with the assumption that due to the variable 
routes and dynamic topology, the lines of communication cannot 
be trusted. More recently, this philosophy has been applied to 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs).  
MANETs often use wireless radio communication as their 
transmission medium. Due to the inherently broadcast nature of 
typical radio transceivers, the medium can be assumed to be 
insecure. This is known as the open-medium problem; the 
medium itself is observable by third-parties in range and is 
therefore insecure unless steps are taken to prevent trivial 
observation of communication. 
VPN approaches have been used to secure MANETs, VPLS 
most notably for its mesh-based approach to the formation of a 
secure network over insecure infrastructure. IPsec [3] and 
OpenVPN [4] have also seen use in MANETs comprised of 
roaming nodes, allowing communication over third party 
wireless infrastructure between nodes when they move out of 
range of each other. In all such cases, the emphasis has been on 
point-to-point communication; in which nodes are expected to 
communicate on a 1:1 basis.  
Virtual Closed Networks (VCN) deviate from the VPN 
philosophy in two key areas; behavioural control of 
communication and hierarchical provision of security. VCN 
nodes must submit to a common set of communication 
behaviours. Deviation from these behaviours mark a node as an 
imposter, or malicious node. All communication outside of the 
expected set is ignored, and the malicious node is denied access.  
This paper investigates the efficiency of the VCN approach, 
when compared with a selection of VPN protocols. The security 
features of the VCN and VPN approach are compared in 
qualitative discussion, while the costs associated with securing 
a MANET using OpenVPN, IPsec, VPLS [5] and Security Using 
Pre-Existing Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
(SUPERMAN) are analysed using the quantitative results of 
simulation.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Autonomous MANET Security Considerations 
The primary concern for any MANET using wireless 
communication, is the open-medium problem [6]. The problem 
is characterised by an insecure communication medium; a means 
of communication that can be trivially observed and interfered 
with, with no ability to directly protect the medium against such 
attacks. The open-medium problem means that any 
communication between nodes in a MANET must be assumed 
to be insecure by its very nature, requiring that steps be taken to 
ensure confidentiality, integrity and authentication.  
1) Vulnerabilities 
The first key weakness exposed by the open-medium 
problem is that of observable communication. Passive attacks 
against networks are a common precursor to more aggressive 
cyber-attacks. Eavesdropping on communication, recording data 
and mapping the topology of a network from the outside are all 
possible if a malicious observer has unfettered access to 
information flowing through the network. Such information 
must be protected to ensure that malicious observers are not able 
to steal identifying information or critical information about the 
nature of the mission being undertaken by the network.  
A second stage of attack is likely, should sufficient 
information be gathered [7]. Impersonation, Sybil, wormhole 
and black hole attacks depend on a certain critical mass of data 
being accumulated to allow malicious nodes the ability to fool 
legitimate nodes into believing that the malicious nodes are 
members of the network [8].  
Such attacks are referred to as active attacks, and they 
directly impact on network attributes, such as quality of service 
and reliability. They frequently compromise related functions of 
the network, such as the application layer requirements of 
communication; the ability to communicate mission-vital 
information or control associated functions in a distributed 
fashion. By compromising communication in a MANET, an 
attacker can disrupt or destroy the associated functionality of the 
network.  
2) Securing the Network 
ITU-Rec X.805 outlines the security threats to wireless 
networks and associated defences against such threats. Five 
threats are identified, and eight solutions are proposed to counter 
them. The five threats are; destruction, corruption or 
modification of data, theft or removal of data, disclosure of 
information, and interruption of services [9].  
The proposed counters to these threats are; access control, 
authentication, non-repudiation, data confidentiality, 
communication security, data integrity, availability, and privacy. 
It is possible that only some of these security services are 
required. For example; non-repudiation is only required if 
interruption of services is anticipated. However, it must be noted 
that in long-lived MANETs, operating without human control, 
full-suite security is preferable due to the inability to predict the 
nature, form or intent of a cyber-attack that occurs in the field.  
B. Virtual Private Networks 
VPNs represent a class of network that operates in a 
pessimistic state. Unlike naive MANET implementations, where 
the medium is assumed to be trustworthy and all node 
benevolent, VPNs assume that the medium is insecure, and that 
the network is subject to observation and attack at any moment.  
Privacy is the core philosophy of the VPN. VPNs were 
initially intended to protect the privacy of communication 
between end-points over unsecured mediums, such as the 
Internet. Some point-to-point implementations have been 
proposed, though these are usually limited in scope (closely 
situated collections of trusted nodes) and are more akin to VCNs 
than traditional VPN architectures [10].  
OpenVPN is an open-source application developed to secure 
communications between machines in separate locations, over a 
potentially insecure link [11]. It is capable of traversing multiple 
network domains and makes use of the OpenSSL and TLS 
standards for certificate exchange, or pre-shared key-based 
approaches to authenticating legitimate members of the VPN. 
This is further enhanced by the addition of user-selected 
passphrase insertion to the SSL/TLS authentication process, 
should the user select this option.  
VPLS adds multicast (and in some cases broadcast) 
functionality, emulating Ethernet functionality to extend the 
ability to address all members of the VPN despite their disparate 
geographical locations and variable routes (which VPLS does 
not track or maintain). Due to the added complexity of 
maintaining a LAN emulation over potentially insecure 
infrastructure, a full mesh is required [12]. This means that all 
nodes must be connected to all other nodes. That may be over n-
hops, but all nodes must have a viable end-to-end connection to 
all others to participate in the network. Although useful for 
MANET implementations, where broadcast functionality is 
highly desirable, the additional memory overhead and 
connectivity requirements can be a problem in networks with an 
unreliable communication medium. VPLS has been secured 
using modified Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Base Exchange 
(BEX) by Liyanage and Gurtov [13].  
IPsec is a suite of protocols intended to provide secure end-
to-end communication between nodes in a network. IPsec is 
typical of VPN philosophy, in that it provides end-to-end 
security between nodes, but plays no role in point-to-point 
security and relies on secure routing to protect data in transit. It 
extends confidentiality, integrity and authentication services to 
mutually authenticated end-points, but does not provide 
MANET-specific support. MANET implementation, such as 
MANIPSEC have been shown to improve the performance of 
IPsec and extend multicast capabilities to communication using 
IPsec over MANETs, but the intensive key-exchange and 
authentication mechanisms continue to represent a substantial 
overhead for resource-limited networks [14].  
III. VIRTUAL CLOSED NETWORKS 
VCNs differ from VPNs, in that the focus is on the network, 
not the links that form it. VPNs seek to protect instances of 
communication between nodes in a network, they define a series 
of secure links between nodes, with may be 1:1 or 1:N in nature. 
However, the focus is set on the links, the network topology, 
access control policy and communication medium play no role 
in defining the VPN. VCNs adhere to a holistic core philosophy. 
They are intended to provide security by closing the network 
against outside interference, both end-to-end and point-to-point.  
A VCN will extend protection beyond confidentiality, 
integrity and authentication, by providing services that ensure 
routes are secure. This provides weak guarantees of delivery; 
weak due to the fact that medium-control is not a part of most 
VCNs, and so disruption of the communication medium may 
still cause loss of data. However, such loss will not be driven by 
the inclusion of malicious nodes in the routing process; a VCN 
will not tolerate unknown propagation of packets unless specific 
white-listing of message-types is included in the security 
definitions it adheres to.   
Fig. 1 shows a grouping of twelve MANET nodes, all of 
which are members of the same network. All nodes have secure 
end-to-end connections with each other, forming a VPN. In a 
VPN, the links on the route to a destination are unimportant, 
security services are applied to the packet and the route is trusted 
to propagate it towards a destination. As a result, the 
trustworthiness and reliability of each node on a route are 
unimportant to the VPN. 
 
 
Fig. 1 A full-mesh VPN of twelve nodes 
MANET nodes must assume the role of router and end-point 
to maintain a viable network. As a result, the intermediate nodes 
in a route cannot be assumed to simply route messages between 
distant nodes; they have the capability to act on received data, 
storing it or relaying it to third parties. End-to-end 
communication may be secure, but the incorporation of 
untrusted nodes into the routing process represents a significant 
security risk in the long term. It must be noted that unless a 
secure routing method is selected for the MANET, routing will 
be insecure; allowing any nodes with the appropriate suite of 
protocols to participate. For example, unsecured Ad hoc On 
Demand Distance Vector (AODV) will allow any responding 
node also using AODV within the defined address space to 
participate in routing, allowing potential attackers to be 
incorporated into the network topology directly. This applies to 
any unsecured routing protocol.  
 
 
Fig. 2 A full-mesh VCN of ten nodes with two non-member nodes in 
communication range 
Fig. 2 shows an abstraction of a VCN. Ten nodes are in the 
VCN (blue nodes), while two (the grey nodes) are not. Being in 
a VCN means being recognised by the network as a legitimate 
member node. Appropriate confidentiality, integrity and 
authentication protocols must be applied across all node, both 
end-to-end and point-to-point for a MANET to be considered to 
be a closed-network.  
Member nodes may only communicate with each other 
securely, they will not trust grey nodes to propagate their traffic 
intentionally (though it may still be received). The rectangle 
boundary around the network represents the virtual element of 
the closure of the network. This is an abstraction of closure, the 
actual closure is performed on each node. Because of this, the 
heavy black lines between blue nodes represent that they must 
be neighbours to uphold the protocols keeping the network 
closed against outside intrusion.  
VCNs are not as far-reaching in scope as VPNs, due to this 
tightly-knit security approach. A VCN may use a VPN to 
communicate over unreliable infrastructure to reach another 
VCN, end-point or designated network of another type, as an 
extension of its communication. Alone, a VCN closes the target 
network against outside observation and interference at the node 
level. By ensuring all nodes adhere to the same security 
protocols, even the most distributed network may protect itself 
in a unified manner, mitigating the effects of an open 
communication medium by ensuring that observers may only 
obtain encrypted data, and are refused participation in the 
routing of such information.  
IV. SUPERMAN: A NOVEL VCN ARCHITECTURE 
Security Using Pre-Existing Routing for Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks (SUPERMAN), is a novel security framework that, at 
its core, represents a VCN approach to MANET security. The 
development of SUPERMAN was driven by the need for 
autonomous UAV networks; resource limited networks 
comprised of lightweight nodes. Such networks have specific 
communication requirements; they require frequent 
communication to self-organise and distribute tasks, they require 
security to ensure that mission-data and network-data are not 
obtained or modified by malicious parties, and they must do both 
as efficiently as possible, due to the limited bandwidth.  
To ensure that all of these needs are met, a VCN approach 
has been proposed. Key to this approach, is the ability to 
authenticate new nodes and ensure that the network may accept 
new members and deprecate nodes as the need arises. This need 
is driven by the application in question; for example a surveying 
task using nodes mounted on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), with a duration longer than the maximum flight time of 
the UAVs being used to perform it, will need to accept 
replacements, if it is to proceed with the mission without pauses 
for redeployment.  
SUPERMAN uses a certificate-based approach to 
authenticate new nodes and allow them to become members of 
the network if they have the appropriate credentials. Once 
authenticated with the network, a node will begin to form secure 
links, by associating itself with other member nodes on-demand. 
It is at this point that knowledge of the state of nodes on a route 
becomes important.  
Nodes may participate in routing once they have become 
members of the network, using network-wide keys for broadcast 
communication. They must securely associate with each other to 
communicate in a unicast or multicast manner with other nodes. 
A SUPERMAN node must exchange a key-share with other 
nodes, receiving theirs in response and performing Diffie-
Hellman key exchange to generate appropriate keys for end-to-
end and point-to-point cryptographic functions.  
SUPERMAN nodes will not propagate such information 
along routes with non-member nodes, and no intermediate node 
in the route will propagate the security data to a neighbouring 
node it isn’t securely associated with. If nodes are network 
members, and are securely associated with each neighbouring 
node, the propagation of security credentials between end-points 
can begin. Security associations are formed on demand, when a 
source node requires direct communication with another which 
it doesn’t yet have security associations with.  
Due to the potentially large number of nodes in a 
SUPERMAN network, and the large amount of security 
associations that must be formed during the course of a mission, 
measures have been taken to reduce the communications 
overhead associated with this phase of security set-up.  
In VPN systems like IPsec, VPLS and OpenVPN, nodes will 
associate over an undetermined number of nodes in a route. It 
does not matter if these nodes are members of the VPN or 
untrusted infrastructure, the exchange of credentials occurs over 
the full length of the route.  
SUPERMAN employs a delegated authentication method to 
reduce the effective length of routes in the VCN, if possible. If a 
route between two nodes includes one or more nodes that have 
previous associated with the destination of the security 
association request, it will reply to that request on behalf of the 
target, instead of propagating the request to the target node. This 
has the effect of effectively shortening the length of the route 
between source and destination nodes during security 
association. This is possible due to each SUPERMAN node 
keeping a security table of key shares associated with each node 
it has previous associated with. As keys are unique to the link 
between two associated nodes, delegated authentication does not 
allow the delegate node to form a key on behalf of the 
associating pair, instead, it merely passes on required key share 
data to allow the end-points to generate the cryptographic keys 
required to secure their communication link. This method allows 
for the expedient, efficient sharing of security information in a 
safe, robust manner. By allowing nodes to exchange the 
credentials of nodes they have securely associated with, the cost 
associated with exchanging authentication information securely 
over the full length of the route as one must in a VPN is 
mitigated.  
V. METHODOLOGY 
A. Hypothesis 
It is hypothesised that the SUPERMAN VCN approach to 
secure MANET communication will provide a more efficient 
(less costly per node) set-up than its VPN equivalents. VPLS 
should benefit from its multicast capabilities in the latter link-
securing stage of the security set-up process, relative to IPsec 
and OpenVPN. However, SUPERMAN should outperform all 
three VPN approaches, by ensuring that all nodes in the network 
may be trusted, and using this knowledge to allow the use of 
delegated authentication to reduce the effective distance 
between non-neighbouring nodes that must form a secure end-
to-end link between themselves.  
B. Simulation Parameters 
Simulation is undertaken using MATLAB. IPsec, 
OpenVPN, VPLS and SUPERMAN are simulated to allow 
comparison of their end-to-end authentication and key 
generation communication. The number of communication 
events (transmissions, assumed to be within MTU) and number 
of bytes transmitted are recorded, reported and analysed.  
The simulated network is a MANET of 10-100 nodes. The 
network is fully connected, with a hop count of 5 setting the 
maximum boundary for the length of routes between nodes. 
Where required by the selected VPN protocol, node ID 1 is 
selected as the server for VPN authentication protocols.  
Due to the differing capabilities of the three VPN approaches 
selected for this comparison, two experiments have been 
devised, both adhering to the settings outlined in Table 1. It is 
assumed that the network suffers no loss or packet corruption. 
TABLE 1  
MATLAB simulation parameters 
Number of Nodes: 10 - 100 
Routing Algorithm: Dijkstrka [15]  
(shortest path) 
Number of Iterations: 50 
Simulation Area: 100m x 100m 
Communication Range: 50m 
Max Hop Count: 5 
Random Seed: 11 
Key Share Size: 128 bytes 
Certificate Size: 1013 bytes 
1) Network Authentication 
This experiment involves the authentication of nodes with 
the network itself. IPsec and OpenVPN do not extend network 
authentication functionality, being focused on client-server and 
client-client pairings for secure tunnel formation.  
SUPERMAN and VPLS, however, occupy broadcast 
network domains, allowing for more complex interaction 
between their respective nodes. As a result, both approaches 
require that nodes authenticate with the network. SUPERMAN 
nodes must authenticate with each other with a valid point of 
origin; demonstrating their initialisation by a trusted authority 
by exchange certificates. VPLS designates a central server that 
authenticates nodes and equips them with unidirectional 
(initiator and responder) keys common to the broadcast virtual 
Ethernet mesh used for VPN communication. VPLS does not 
extend services to routing, it is assumed that routing will take 
place without VPLS securing those routes. All routes are pre-
generated for VPLS, whereas SUPERMAN will only begin 
routing once nodes have authenticated with the network 
(receiving broadcast keys in the process).  
This experiment involves the comparison of VPLS and 
SUPERMAN network authentication communication, including 
communication events and bytes transmitted.  
2) Key Negotiation (End-to-End) 
SUPERMAN, OpenVPN, IPsec and VPLS all secure tunnels 
between nodes. This is the primary function of all four 
approaches, though SUPERMAN and VPLS extend further 
network authentication procedures to facilitate more complex 
use of network topology during communication over secure 
tunnels.  
All four approaches are simulated forming secure tunnels 
between all nodes in the target network. This is assumed to be 
performed in an isolated environment, nodes are only 
communicating security information during this process; no 
ancillary communication can occur until the process is complete. 
The communication events and data (in bytes) required by this 
process is compared to highlight the differences between the 
VPN protocols selected and the SUPERMAN VCN framework.  
VI. RESULTS 
Results are broken down into two data types; network 
authentication and tunnelling operations. These are further 
broken down into communication events and bytes transmitted. 
A sub-section analysing and discussing the security dimensions 
addressed by the VPN and VCN approaches that have been 
simulated, provides routing and security service analysis. This 
comparison is intended to identify the desirable features 
possessed by the VPN and VCN approaches to MANET 
security. 
A. Network Authentication 
Fig. 3 shows the number of communication events required 
by SUPERMAN and VPLS during authentication with the 
network.  
 
Fig. 3 Graph showing the number of communication events required to 
authenticate all nodes with the network 
VPLS is shown to consistently require more communication 
events to achieve network authentication than SUPERMAN. 
VPLS requires a central server for authentication with the mesh-
like VLAN environment it creates for all member nodes, 
creating a central point of failure for the authentication of new 
nodes. This can also result in long routes between nodes and the 
central server node, unless the MANET maintains a dense 
topology.  
SUPERMAN, only requiring that the neighbouring node 
(any node in range) is an authentic SUPERMAN node, with the 
appropriate certificate and protocol suite to facilitate network 
authentication, is more efficient in terms of communication 
events. In networks of 100 nodes, SUPERMAN requires 38% 
less communication events than VPLS.  
Fig. 4, however, demonstrates that the SUPERMAN 
requirement that certificates are exchanged bi-directionally and 
that neighbouring nodes perform security association alongside 
network authentication leads to much higher data requirements, 
despite fewer transmissions.  
 
Fig. 4 Graph showing the number of bytes transmitted when authenticating all 
nodes with the network 
VPLS requires that the central authentication server provides 
a certificate to nodes able to authenticate with it via a puzzle-
solution exchange mechanism. Successful authentication results 
in a certificate being exchanged with the petitioning node by the 
authentication server. Once authenticated, the node becomes a 
member of the VPLS mesh-Ethernet broadcast domain governed 
by the server.  
The completion of the authentication process results in the 
petitioning node possessing a Diffie-Hellman derived key for the 
VPLS domain to which it has subscribed, and a certificate as 
proof of its validity (provided by the authentication server).  
SUPERMAN is shown to initially require less data than 
VPLS to authenticate with the network, but rapidly grows in cost 
as the network increases in size. This is due to the incorporation 
of identifying information and a key share in discovery packets, 
driving up the cost of probing for potential authenticator nodes.  
VPLS requires 15.8% of the data needed by SUPERMAN, 
as connections with the central authenticator node are 
established using a lightweight exchange of puzzle and solution 
data, the exchange of which is initiated by simple HELLO 
messages and terminated by a signed acknowledgement. The 
initialisation and termination messages are substantially smaller 
than those used by SUPERMAN, as point-to-point security is 
not applied. Diffie-Hellman key data is only exchanged once a 
connection has been established with the authentication server, 
reducing the size of HELLO packets considerable, when 
compared to SUPERMAN equivalents.  
However, this process is entirely dependent on the central 
node being reachable. VPLS does not participate in, or secure, 
routing. As a result, the intermediate nodes involved in the 
communication of credentials between the authentication server 
and petitioning nodes cannot be considered as trustworthy. Any 
loss of contact or destruction of the central node will result in the 
authentication process failing and the node being unable to join 
the network.  
SUPERMAN is resilient against such disruption, as it only 
requires that two nodes sharing a common-trusted-source (the 
certificate issuer or a higher authority shared by their issuers) to 
communicate and form a new SUPERMAN network. The 
additional cost is high, but required in networks with 
unpredictable topology and communication medium, such as 
MANETs.  
VPLS will establish a VPN at a low initial cost, but only 
assuming that loss rates are low and that the central node remains 
reachable at all times. SUPERMAN, operating in a pre-route 
MANET (in which no routes have been formed), will incur a 
higher cost due to the larger packets and one-hop topology of the 
network during the authentication process leading to a more 
communication-intensive authentication process. SUPERMAN 
will, however, provide security to routing among nodes that 
have authenticated with the network, whereas VPLS will not 
provide any security to routing among networked nodes.   
B. Secure Tunnelling 
Fig. 5 shows that SUPERMAN requires the least 
communication events to have all nodes form security 
associations (secure tunnels) between all other network 
members. IPsec requires the most by a considerable margin, 
while VPLS and OpenVPN, sharing a tunnel forwarding 
mechanism, have consistently similar communication event 
counts.  
 
Fig. 5 Graph showing the number of communication events that occur during 
the formation of secure tunnels between all nodes 
SUPERMAN makes significant gains when forming secure 
tunnels between nodes. A delegated authentication mechanism 
allows SUPERMAN nodes to vouch for nodes that they know to 
be legitimate if they are on the route between source and 
destination when a source node attempts to form a secure tunnel 
with the destination node. This is possible due to the topology-
aware characteristics of VCNs. When a MANET of 100 nodes 
is attempting to form secure tunnels between all member nodes, 
delegated authentication results in SUPERMAN requiring 
19.5% less communication than VPLS and OpenVPN, and 
46.3% less than IPsec.  
Fig. 6 shows that SUPERMAN, in networks of up to 47 
nodes, requires the least data transmission to form secure 
tunnels. In larger networks, VPLS shows considerable 
scalability. IPsec is demonstrably the heaviest approach in terms 
of data utilisation for large networks, though in smaller network 
(60 nodes or fewer) OpenVPN is more costly in terms of data.  
 
Fig. 6 Graph showing the number of bytes transmitted when establishing 
secure tunnels between nodes 
VPLS requires 45% less data to be transmitted to secure all 
nodes in the network, when compared with SUPERMAN in 100 
node MANETs. This is due to the broadcast mesh-Ethernet 
approach taken by VPLS. Nodes do not require complicated key 
exchanges, the central server determines send and receive keys 
ahead of tunnel formation, requiring that nodes only have to 
exchange identifying information and a puzzle variable to 
associate with each other. SUPERMAN requires the change of 
key shares to allow Diffie-Hellman key generation to occur and 
provide a unique key associated with the end-to-end and point-
to-point links between source and destination.  
SUPERMAN does benefit from the delegate authentication 
mechanism, which reduces the effective length of routes by 
allowing intermediate nodes already associated with the 
destination of a request for secure association to intervene and 
prevent further propagation of the request as it services the 
source-request for destination-credentials. As a result, 
SUPERMAN requires 9.2% less data than OpenVPN, and 41% 
less data than IPsec in a 100 node network.  
C. Provision of Security Services 
ITU-T Rec X.805, as previously discussed, outlines eight 
security dimensions. These must be addressed at least in part to 
provide a secure environment for communication over any 
network.  
Table 2 outlines the security dimensions provided by 
SUPERMAN, VPLS, OpenVPN and IPsec. SUPERMAN 
extends all eight security dimensions, providing access control 
by closing the network against any outside use or interference. 
Only nodes authenticated with the network may use network 
resources. Furthermore, adherence to the VCNs security 
protocols provides non-repudiation and communication 
security, which VPN approaches cannot guarantee.  
TABLE 2 
The ITU-T Rec X.805 Security Dimension coverage of SUPERMAN, VPLS, 
OpenVPN and IPsec 
Security 
Dimension 
SUPERMAN VPLS OpenVPN IPsec 
Access Control X    
Authentication X X X X 
Non-repudiation X    
Data 
Confidentiality 
X X X X 
Communication 
Security 
X    
Data Integrity X X X X 
Availability X X X X 
Privacy X X X X 
 
The three VPN approaches do not provide access control, 
non-repudiation or communication security. None of the three 
analysed frameworks control access to network resources. 
VPLS controls access to the mesh-Ethernet domain it 
establishes, but nodes may still be routed over, unless segregated 
from the untrusted infrastructure over-which it may be 
communicating.  
Non-repudiation is not provided, as connections are usually 
end-to-end. Higher-authorities are involved in the authentication 
of nodes and provision of credentials to secure tunnels. This 
means that once a node has been given appropriate credentials, 
it is possible for that node to deny malicious action, unless trust-
based systems are put in place to augment the baseline security 
provided by the VPN. Some implementations of IPsec and 
VPLS allow for unique timestamping to add an additional layer 
of identification to packets, providing a measure of non-
repudiation by tying specific packets to identities in an 
irrefutable manner.  
Communication security requires that information flows 
only between authorised end-points. Due to the tolerance of 
untrusted infrastructure by VPN approaches, this cannot be 
guaranteed. Though it may be argued that the open-medium 
problem of wireless communication would compromise 
SUPERMAN’s provision of such services, SUPERMAN does 
not allow routing over untrusted nodes. It therefore does not 
compromise communication security as a function of the 
framework itself, though it cannot entirely mitigate the open-
medium problem.  
By closing the network, using a VCN philosophy to prevent 
the use of untrusted network resources, one can protect a 
MANET against trivial insertion of hostile nodes, identity theft 
and the destruction or dissemination of data by intermediate 
untrusted nodes on routes between end-points. SUPERMAN’s 
additional cost is reflective of greater security service provision, 
and a more granular approach to network security in highly 
mobile, dynamic MANETs.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
When comparing VPN and VCN approaches, it is important 
to bear in mind the target network. VPNs typically provide end-
to-end security over untrusted infrastructure (with no security 
guarantees regarding the route taken between end-points), while 
VCNs secure a specific network by locking it down completely 
and not allowing propagation of data over untrusted parties to 
form a part of operational principle.  
SUPERMAN, the VCN approach proposed in this paper, 
also protects routing, and forms a secure network environment 
prior to routing operations. VPN approaches require that 
infrastructure is pre-existing, and that infrastructure may not be 
trustworthy.  
Indeed, VPNs are intended to function over untrusted 
infrastructure, but for distributed MANETs of many nodes, this 
may not be feasible due to the relative intelligence of MANET 
nodes over static infrastructure. Untrusted nodes in a MANET 
scenario have far greater power to destroy or reroute data than 
mono-task switches and routers in conventional infrastructural 
networks, making them a significant threat to quality of service 
and network resources.  
VPN approaches to secure MANETs have been recorded in 
a considerable body of scientific literature, including attempts to 
use IPsec, OpenVPN and VPLS to allow secure communication 
between MANET nodes in wireless sensor, micro-UAV and 
UAV swarm scenarios. Each approach tends to treat other 
MANET nodes as untrusted, ignoring the potential offered by 
the topology-awareness and control of MANET nodes. VPN 
approaches fail to account for a variety of attacks that MANETs 
are extremely vulnerable to; man-in-the-middle, impersonation 
and Sybil attacks being prominent examples. They are also 
vulnerable to attacks that abuse route-agnostic systems, such as 
the black hole and wormhole attacks. 
SUPERMAN ensures that only authenticated members of 
the network are included on secure communication routes, 
mitigating the issues caused by route-agnostic communication 
being abused by malicious undetected intermediate nodes. The 
proposed framework extends cost-saving measures, as 
MANETs have a potentially unreliable communication medium, 
resource-constrained network hardware, in many cases.  
Simulation of SUPERMAN and three VPN approaches has 
shown that SUPERMAN performs favourably when considering 
the number of transmissions required to authenticate all nodes 
with the network and form secure tunnels between all nodes. 
However, VPLS has been shown, in 100% reliable 
communication conditions, to require less data due to its 
lightweight, low-complexity approach to constructing a virtual 
mesh-Ethernet domain for its member nodes. As discussed in 
sub-section VI C, the inclusion of untrusted nodes in the routing 
process, and the lack of route-security under VPLS, 
compromises any expectations of 100% delivery rates. VPLS 
does not address the core issues of route-agnosticism leading to 
an inability to diagnose and cope with rerouting, destruction and 
manipulation of data between nodes. It also is not designed with 
unreliable transport as a consideration, requiring a reliable (if 
untrusted) infrastructure to facilitate communication between 
nodes.  
In highly mobile MANETs with potentially unreliable 
wireless communication, packet loss may be considerable. This 
would have a highly adverse effect on VPLS, as it requires 
periodic communication with a central node on the part of all 
member nodes to ensure all keys are up to date for secure 
communication. As a result, it may be concluded that expecting 
100% delivery rates in a MANET is ill-advised, even before 
considering the inherent unreliability of wireless 
communication. It is trivial for malicious nodes to place 
themselves on a route, and sink or disseminate data, as VPLS 
does not provide any protection other than integrity and 
confidentiality to data in transit, and is unaware of the route 
taken.  
Future work will focus on mobile nodes with variable 
reliability to further analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of 
VPN and VCN approaches to secure MANET communication. 
Of particular interest is the effect that increasing loss rates will 
have on VPLS, as it has performed very well in terms of efficient 
communication for scenarios assuming perfect communication 
characteristics. Side-by-side comparison of SUPERMAN and 
VPLS will be a focal point in the research undertaken to analyse 
the effect of mobility and unreliable communication on secure 
MANET formation; and how such negative impacts on 
performance can be reduced.  
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